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Abstract
We reexamine the optimal scal and monetary policy in combined shopping-time monetary
models with capital accumulation. Four models are constructed to examine how the produc-
tion cost of money and the utility from physical capital a¤ect the toolbox of the scal and
monetary policy. It is shown that the optimality of the Friedman rule hinges on the producing
cost of money and capital-in-utility overturns the Chamley-Judd zero capital income taxation
theorem. When the production cost of money approaches zero, the Friedman rule is optimal;
and when the consumer cares about the utility from capital, the limiting capital income tax
is not zero in general.
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1 Introduction
The problem of optimal scal and monetary policy has been analyzed in numerous studies. Most
of these studies examine scal and monetary policies separately. Dynamic taxation theorists
examine how to tax factor incomes in dynamic models without money.1 Some researchers on
monetary theory execute their analysis in monetary models without capital accumulation2, other
researchers investigate optimal monetary policies in monetary models with capital but without
any considerations on dynamic scal policies3. Besides, a few researchers examine the optimal
scal and monetary policy in monetary economies without capital.4 The purpose of this paper is
to reexamine the optimal scal and monetary policy in a combined monetary model with capital
accumulation. We construct four models with di¤erent combinations on the production cost of
capital and the utility generated by physical capital. Some of them reproduces zero norminal
interest rate or zero limiting capital income tax; others generate more complex tradeo¤s from
which we develop interesting new insights.
Dynamic tax theory follows the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopman (RCK) framework. The
most importang result in this research agenda is the famous Chamley-Judd zero capital income
taxation theorem developed by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). The theroem brings about an
importang question in the theory of public nance: is physical capital special as a stock? In
a generalized model with human capital and e¤ective labor, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997)
establish that under some conditions5 both capital and labor income taxes can be chosen to be
zero in the steady state; moreover, if preferences satisfy an additional condition, all taxes can
be chosen to be asymptotically zero. That is, there is nothing special for physical capital as a
stock variable, and the taxation rules on factors income hinge on model specications. A large
literature working on this research line drives very di¤erent conclusions from di¤erent channels,
such as Lucas (1990), Zhu (1992), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997), Aiyagari (1995), Correia
(1996), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), etc.. On the other hand, a large literature
on optimal monetary policy is motivated by Friedman (1969)s seminal contribution in which he
proposed a monetary policy rule that might generate zero nominal interest rates (on assets with a
riskless nominal return). There are many supporters and opponents of the Friedman rule. Most of
them bases their arguments on the uniform commodity taxation theorem developed by Atkinson
1See Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997), Aiyagari (1995), Correia
(1996), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003).
2See Calvo (1983), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Correia and Teles (1996, 1999), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1996).
3See Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), Stockman (1981), Chamley (1985).
4See Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chary, Christiano, Kehoe (1991), Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008).
5Jone, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) provide these three conditions: (1) there are no prots from accumuating
either capital stock, (2) the tax code is su¢ciently rich, and, (3) there is no role for relative prices to reduce the
value of xed sources of income.
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and Stiglitz (1972) or the intermediate good optimal taxation rules by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971). Economists come to realize that both theorems cannot apply directly and need additional
preconditions, as suggested by Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), Chamley (1985), Kimbrough
(1986), Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh (1993), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Correia and
Teles (1996), and Woodford (1990), etc.. Acturally, a simple argument of the Friedman rule is
that a good that is costless to produce should be priced at zero. Correia and Teles (1996) argue
that this simple rule about the production cost of money plays the key role in determining the
optimality of the Friedman rule. They show that if the production cost of real money approaches
zero, the Friedman rule is optimal; if not, the Friedman rule is not optimal and the optimal
ination tax relies on the degree of homogeneity of the transaction function.
In the paper, we utilize the shopping-time monetary model examined by Kimbrough (1986),
Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh (1993), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles
(1996), and Woodford (1990) and focus on examining how two important channels (i.e., the
production cost of money and the utility from physical capital) a¤ect the optimal scal and
monetary policies in four models with di¤erent combinations. Many classical results are recovered
in the generalized models while many new insights are also developed. In the costless-money
model without CIU (Model 1) we recover the famous results of both zero limiting capital income
taxation and zero nominal interest rate that developed by Chamley (1986) and Correia and Teles
(1996) respectively. In model 2, once money is costly produced, the Friedman rule is not optimal
and the optimal ination rate relies on the optimal tax rate on the labor force employed in the
money sector. Meanwhile, the tax structure for capital income is changed accordingly. When
the consumer cares about the utility from the capital stock, just as in model 3, the Chamley-
Judd zero capital income taxation theorem will not hold, i.e., the limiting capital income tax
is not zero in general, even though the Friedman rule is still optimal. Incorporating Capital-
in-utility generates a non-pecuniary return (i.e., uk (t+ 1) = (uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1))) in
the asset pricing equaiton (i.e., consumption Euler equation or the no-arbitrage condition), which
contradicts the negative e¤ect of capital taxes on the pecuniary return (i.e.,
 
1  kt+1

rt+1+1 )
and makes the sign of the limiting capital tax ambiguous. In model 4, with costly money and
CIU, neither the Friedman rule nor the Chamley-Judd zero capital taxation theorem is true in
general. The production cost of money and CIU interact in determining the optimal scal and
monetary policy. The main results of the paper are summerized in Table 1.
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money ciu ination tax captial income tax
Model 1 costless without It = 0 
k = 0
Model 2 costly without It
<
=
>
(1  n2t), if v
>
=
<
1
k1 = 0;
k2 =
(r2 2) (r1 1)
r2
Model 3 costless with It = 0 
k 6= 0
Model 4 costly with It
<
=
>
(1  n2t), if v
>
=
<
1
k1 6= 0;
k2 =
(r2 2) (r1 1)
r2
+ r1r2 
k
1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A baseline costless-money model without
capital-in-utility is examined in cection 2, in which both the ination tax and the limiting capital
income tax are zero. Section 3 investigates a costly-money model without capital-in-utility and
nds out that the Friedman rule does not hold. In section 4, we introduce the physical capital
stock into the utility function of models in sections 2 and 3 and explore how capital-in-utility
changes the results on the optimal monetary policy. Section 5 gives the concluding remarks.
2 The model with costless money (Model 1)
2.1 Model setup
In this section, we consider a monetary economy with capital accumuation and costless money.
An innitely lived representative household likes consumption, leisure streams fct; ltg
1
t=0 that give
higher values of
1X
t=0
tu (ct; lt) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1), ct  0 and lt  0 are consumption and leisure at time t, respectively, and
uc; ul > 0, ucc; ull < 0, and ucl  0.
6 The household is endowed with one unit of time per period
that can be used for leisure lt, labor nt, and shopping st, and the time allocation equation is
lt + nt + st = 1: (2)
To acquire the consumption good, the household allocates time to shopping. The amount
of shopping time st is positively related to the consumption level ct and negatively related to
6uii < 0 says that the marginal utility of any commodity decreases in its own consumption, while uij > 0 tells
that the marginal utility of one commodity increases in the consumption of any other commodity.
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the households holdings of real money balances mt+1=pt  bmt+1. Specically, the shopping or
transaction technology is
st = H

ct;
mt+1
pt

; (3)
where H;Hc; Hcc; Hm=p;m=p  0, Hm=p; Hc;m=p  0.
7 The shopping technology is assumed to be
homogeneous of degree v  0 in consumption ct and real money balances mt+1=pt:
st = H (ct; bmt+1) = cvtH 1; bmt+1ct

; for ct > 0.
By Eulers theorem we have
Hc (ct; bmt+1) ct +Hbm (ct; bmt+1) bmt+1 = vH (ct; bmt+1) : (4)
For any consumption level ct, we assume that a point of satiation in real money balances  c such
that
H (ct; bmt+1) = Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = 0; for bmt+1   c.
It is not worthwhile to increase real balance holdings beyond this point since by doing it, it is not
possilbe to save resources.
The single good is produced with labor nt and capital kt. Output can be consumed by
households, used by the government, or used to augment the capital stock. The resource constraint
is
ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt + gt = F (kt; nt) ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1) is the rate at which capital depreciates and fgtg
1
t=0 is an exogenous sequence
of government purchases. We assume a standard increasing and concave production function
that exhibits constant return to scale. By Eulers theorem on homogeneous functions, linear
homogeneity of F implies F (kt; nt) = Fk (kt; nt) kt + Fn (kt; nt)nt.
Government. The government nances its stream of purchases fgtg
1
t=0 by levying proportional
factor taxes on capital and labor income, issuing new debts and printing new currency. In this case
with costless money, the production of money requires no resources. The governments budget
constraint is
gt = 
k
t rtkt + 
n
t wtnt +
Bt+1
Rt
 Bt +
Mt+1  Mt
pt
; (6)
where rt and wt are the market-determined rental rate of capital and the wage rate for labor, 
k
t
and nt are at-rate, time-varying taxes on earnings from capital and labor, and Rt is the gross rate
7Hm=p < 0 and Hm=p;m=p  0 show that an increase in the real quantity of money decreases the time spent
with transactions at a decreasing rate. The restriction on the second derivative of the transactions function assures
that the isoquants of the production function of transactions are convec and that the demand for money depends
negatively on the nominal interest rate.
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of return on one-period bonds held from t to t+1.8 Bt is government indebtedness to the private
sector, denominated in time t goods at the beginning of period t, and Mt is the stock of currency
that the government has issued as of the beginning of period t. Interest earnings on bonds are
assumed to be tax exempt, which is innocuous for bond exchanges between the government and
the private sector. We assume that the government can commit fully and credibly to future tax
rates and thus evade the issue of time-consistency raised in Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Households. A representative household chooses fct; lt; kt+1; bt+1;mt+1g
1
t=0 to maximizes ex-
pression (1) subject to the transaction technology (3), the time allocation constraint (2) and the
sequence of budget constraints
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
+
mt+1
pt
=

1  kt

rtkt + (1  
n
t )wtnt + (1  ) kt + bt +
mt
pt
; (7)
for t  0, given k0; b0 and m0. Here, mt+1  0
9 is nominal money balances held between times t
and t + 1; pt is the price level; bt is the real value of one-period government bond holdings that
mature at the beginning of period t, denominated in units of time t consumption. Substituting the
shopping technology (3) and the time allocation equation (2) into (7), introducing the Lagrange
multiplier t, and constructing the Lagrangian, we solve following the rst-order conditions:
ct : uc (ct; lt) = t [(1  
n
t )wtH (ct; bmt+1) + 1] ; (8)
kt+1 : t = t+1
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
; (9)
lt : ul (ct; lt) = t (1  
n
t )wt; (10)
bt+1 :
t
Rt
= t+1; (11)
mt+1 :

(1  nt )wtHm=p (ct; bmt+1) + 1 tpt = t+1pt+1 : (12)
From equation (8) and (10), we have
ul (ct; lt)
uc (ct; lt)  ul (ct; lt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) = (1  nt )wt; (13)
which displays that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and leisure equals their
(after-tax) price ratio. Substituting equation (8) and the after-tax wage (1  nt )wt in (13) into
(9) leads to the consumption Euler equation"
uc (ct; lt) 
ul (ct; lt)Hc (ct; bmt+1)
#
= 
"
uc (ct+1; lt+1) 
ul (ct+1; lt+1)Hc (ct+1; bmt+2)
# h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
:
(14)
8One-period government bond cannot be accumulated like the private capital. Hence we do not introduce the
government bond into the utility function of the representative consumer in Models 3 and 4 with capital-in-utility.
9Maximization of expression (1) is subject to mt+1  0 for all t  1, since households cannot issue money;
however, no restrictions on the sign of bt+1 for t  1.
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Equations (9) and (11) implies the no-arbitrage condition for trades in capital and bonds that
ensures that these two assets have the same rate of return, namely,
Rt =

1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  : (15)
By substituting equation (15) into equation (14), we obtain an expression for the real interest
rate,
Rt =
[uc (ct; lt)  ul (ct; lt)Hc (t)]
 [uc (ct+1; lt+1)  ul (ct+1; lt+1)Hc (t+ 1)]
: (16)
The combination of equations (11) and (12) yields
Rt  Rmt
Rt
=   (1  nt )wtHm=p (t)

=
it
1 + it
 It

; (17)
which sets the cost equal to the benet of the marginal unit of real money balances held from t
to t+ 1, all expressed in time t consumption goods. Note that Rmt  pt=pt + 1 is the real gross
return on money held from t to t+1, that is, the inverse of the ination rate, and 1+ it  Rt=Rmt
is the gross nominal interest rate. The real return on money Rmt must be less than or equal to
the return on bonds Rt, because otherwise agents would be able to make arbitrarily large prots
by choosing arbitrarily large money holdings nanced by issuing bonds. In other words, the net
nominal interest rate it cannot be negative, i.e., it  0.
Firms. In each period, the representative rm takes (rt; wt) as given, rents capital and labor
from households, and maximizes prots, F (kt; nt)   rtkt   wtnt. The rst-order conditions for
this problem are
Fk (kt; nt) = rt; Fn (kt; nt) = wt: (18)
In words, inputs should be employed until the marginal product of the last unit is equal to its
rental price. With constant return to scale, we get the standard result that pure prots are zero.
2.2 Primal approach to the Ramsey problem
We examine the second-best scal and monetary policy by utilizing the Primal approach developed
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1983). For this purpose we present the
following useful denitions.
Denition: A competive equilibrium is an allocation fct; lt; nt; st; kt+1; bt+1;mt+1g
1
t=0, a price
system fpt; wt; rt; Rtg
1
t=0, and a government policy

gt; 
k
t ; 
n
t ; Bt+1;Mt+1
	1
t=0
such that (a) given
the price system and the government poicy, the allocation solves both the rms problem and the
households problem with bt = Bt and mt = Mt for all t  0; (b) given the allocation and the
price system, the government policy satises the sequence of government budget constraint (6)
for all t  0; (3) the time allocation constraint (2) and the resource constraint (5) are sased for
all t  0.
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There are many competitive equilibria, indexed by di¤erent government policies. This multi-
plicity motivates the Ramsey problem.
Denition. Given k0, b0 and m0, the Ramsey problem is to choose a competitive equilibrium
that maximizes expression (1).
To construct the Ramsey problem, we rstly substitute repeatedly the ow budget constraint
(7) to derive the households present-value budget constraint
1X
t=0
q0t

ct +
it
1 + it
bmt+1 = 1X
t=0
q0t (1  
n
t )wtnt +
h
1  k0

r0 + 1  
i
k0 + b0 +
m0
p0
; (19)
where q0t =
t 1

i=0
R 1i is the Arrow-Debreu price, with the numeriare q
0
0 = 1, and we have imposed
the transversality conditions, limT!1 q
0
T
bT+1
RT
= 0 and limT!1 q
0
T bmT+1 = 0. Putting (16) in the
denition of the Arrow-Debreu price leads to
q0t = 
t uc (ct; lt)  ul (ct; lt)Hc (t)
uc (c0; l0)  ul (c0; l0)Hc (0)
: (20)
Substituting (13), (17), (20) and (4) into the present-value budget constraint (19) and rear-
ranging it, we obtain the implementability condition
1X
t=0
t [uc (ct; lt) ct   ul (ct; lt) (1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1))] = A1; (21)
where A1 is given by
A1 = A

c0; l0; k0; b0;m0; 
k
0

= [uc (c0; l0)  ul (c0; l0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0 +
m0
p0

:
The Ramsey problem is to maximize expression (1) subject to the implementability condition
(21) and the feasibility constraint (5). Let  be a Lagrange multiplier on equation (21) and dene
U (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = u (ct; lt) +  [uc (ct; lt) ct   ul (ct; lt) (1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1))] :
Then we construct the Lagrangian
L=
1X
t=0
t fU (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) + t [F (kt; 1  lt  H (ct; bmt+1)) + (1  ) kt   ct   gt   kt+1]g A1;
where ftg
1
t=0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers. After deriving the rst-order conditions with
respect to ct, lt, kt+1, and bmt+1, for t  0, we combine them and obtain the following optimality
conditions:
Ul (ct; lt; bmt+1; )
Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = Fn (kt; nt)Fn (kt; nt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1 ; (22)
Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; )
[Fn (kt; nt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1] = Uc (ct+1; lt+1; bmt+2; )[Fn (kt+1; nt+1)Hc (ct+1; bmt+2) + 1] [Fk (kt+1; nt+1) + 1  ] ;
(23)
[(+ 1)ul (ct; lt) +  (ucl (ct; lt) ct   ull (ct; lt)nt)]Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = 0; t  0: (24)
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2.3 Model solution and intuitions
Proposition 1 In a monetary model with capital accumulation and costless money, the optimal
monetary policy is the Friedman rule. That is, the optimal ination tax is zero, i.e., It = 0,
which implies that the nominal interest rate is also zero, i.e., it = 0. In the long run, the
optimal capital income tax is zero, i.e., k = 0.
Proof The rst-order condition for real balances (24) is satised when either Hbm (t) = 0 or
(+ 1)ul (ct; lt) +  (ucl (ct; lt) ct   ull (ct; lt)nt) = 0: (25)
The Lagrange multiplier  of the implementability condition, which measures the utility
costs of distorting taxes, is nonnegative. It is easy to know that the left side of equation
(25) is strictly positive, which displays that equation (25) cannot be hold and the solution
has to be Hbm (t) = 0. By equation (17), we know that the optimal ination tax is zero,
It = 0, which implies that the net nominal interest rate is zero, i.e., it = 0. In other words,
the social planner follows the Friedman rule and satiates the economy with real money
balances. To examine the limiting capital income tax, we consider the special case in which
there is a T  0 for which gt = g for all t  T . Assume that there exists a stationary
solution to the Ramsey problem and that it converges to a time-invariant allocation, so that
c, l, n, bm and k are constant after some time. Then because Uc (t) and [Fn (t)Hc (t) + 1]
converge to constants, the stationary version of equation (23) implies
1 =  [Fk (k; n) + 1  ] :
Now because c, l and bm are constant in the limit, equations (14) and (15) imply that
Rt
 
= q0t =q
0
t+1

!  1 and
1 = 
h
1  k

Fk (k; n) + 1  
i
:
Combining the above two equalities implies that k = 0. 
As is shown above, the baseline model can be looked as an extension of Correia and Teles (1996)
by incorporating capital accumulation, or as an extension of Chamley (1986) by introducing money
through a transaction technology. Proposition 2.1 shows that, in a combined monetary model with
capital accumulation, we recover the optimality of the Friedman rule with zero norminal interest
rate and the Chamley-Judd zero capital taxation theorem simultaneously.
Mathematically, the optimality of the Friedman rule in this section is a generalization of other
shopping time monetary models, such as Kimbrough (1986), Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh
(1993), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles (1996), and Woodford (1990).
However, the intuition for zero norminal interest rate is closely related to Correia and Teles
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(1996). They suggest the simple argument of the Friedman rule, which states that a good that is
costless to produce should be priced at zero. Since the marginal cost of the real money balances
is zero, its marginal revenues should be zero. That is to say, the net norminal interest rate is zero,
i.e., it = 0, which implies that the optimal ination tax is also zero, i.e., It = 0. This argument
will be veried in the following costly-money models. In another research line, Sidrauski (1967)
and Chamley (1985) develop money-in-utility (MIU) models to establish the optimality of the
Friedman rule.
Proposition 1 shows that the limiting capital income tax rate is still zero in shopping-time
monetary economies. That is to say, introducing money through transaction technologies has no
e¤ect on savings behavior of the consumer and hence does not change zero capital income tax
result of the standard RCK model. However, shopping-time models change the optimal allocation
of the time endowment of the consumer and distorts the determination of the limiting labor
income tax rate. As is shown in appendix A, the new term ulHc in the formula of the limiting
labor income tax rate makes the sign of the labor tax ambiguous, which implies that the limiting
labor income tax may be positive, zero or negative.
3 The model with costly money (Model 2)
3.1 Setup
In this section we derive the optimal monetary policy and limiting capital tax results in the case in
which money requires resources for its production. We assume that the government (the central
bank)10 employs labor (n2t) and capital (k2t) to produce real money balances with the constant-
return-to-scale (CRS) production technology. The CRS property shows that the government earns
no prots from producing real money balances. For the government, producing money provides
another nancing method for its expenditures11; for the individuals, holding money saves (time)
resources for more leisure or labor supply. For analytical convenience, we assume the production
function for real balances is Cobb-Douglas, namely,
mt+1
pt
= k22t n
1 2
2t ; 2 2 (0; 1) : (26)
For ease of exposition, we assume that the production technology of the consumption good is also
Cobb-Douglas but with di¤erent factor income shares from the production function of money,
namely, F (k1t; n1t) = k
1
1t n
1 1
1t , 1 2 (0; 1), 1 6= 2. We allow for di¤ering tax rates on
10 In most of the countries in the world, the central bank is the sole producer of the fait money.
11The government extracts factors taxes in the sector of money. The net benets from producing money equal
the total revenues
 
mt+1=pt + 
k
2tr2tk2t + 
n
2tw2tn2t

minus the production cost (r2tk2t + w2tn2t). Due to the CRS
property of the production function, the net value is
 
k2tr2tk2t + 
n
2tw2tn2t

. Hence, producing money provides
another nancial method for government expenditures.
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capital and labor used in the production of both the consumption good and money. n1t and n2t,
labor used in the production of the consumption good and money, are taxed at rate n1t and 
n
2t,
respectively; k1t and k2t, capital used in the production of both sectors, are taxed at rate 
k
1t and
k2t, respectively. The transaction technology is also given by (3). The ow budget constraint and
time allocation equation for the households are dened, for t  0, by
ct+k1t+1+k2t+1+
bt+1
Rt
+
mt+1
pt
=
X
i=1;2
h
1  kit

rit + (1  i)
i
kit+
X
i=1;2
(1  nit)witnit+bt+
mt
pt
;
and
lt + st + n1t + n2t = 1; (27)
respectively. The resource constraint12 is
ct + k1t+1 + k2t+1   (1  1) k1t   (1  2) k2t + gt = F (k1t; n1t) = k
1
1t n
1 1
1t : (28)
No arbitrage requires that the after-tax net rental rates of capital and the after-tax wage rates
must be equalized across sectors:
1  k1t

r1t + (1  1) =

1  k2t

r2t + (1  2) ; (1  
n
1t)w1t = (1  
n
2t)w2t: (29)
Let kt = k1t+ k2t and nt = n1t+ n2t. Then the households ow budget constraint (FBC) can be
rewritten as
ct + kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
+
mt+1
pt
=

1  k1t

r1tkt + (1  
n
1t)w1tnt + (1  1) kt + bt +
mt
pt
; (30)
which is the same condition as (7) once
 
kt ; 
n
t ; rt; wt; 

are replaced by
 
k1t; 
n
1t; r1t; w1t; 1

. The
restrictions of the private problem are the budget constraints (30) and the transaction technology
(3), for t  0. The rst-order conditions of the private problem are identical to the ones of Model
1 in Section 2, but with those replacements listed above. We thus have
ul (ct; lt)
uc (ct; lt)  ul (ct; lt)Hc (t)
= (1  n1t)w1t; (31)
[uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)] =  [uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)]
h
1  k1t+1

r1t+1 + 1  1
i
: (32)
Rt =

1  k1t+1

r1t+1 + 1  1 =
[uc (ct; lt)  ul (ct; lt)Hc (ct; bmt+1)]
 [uc (ct+1; lt+1)  ul (ct+1; lt+1)Hc (ct+1; bmt+2)] : (33)
12Note that combining the households budget constraint (30) and the governments budget constraint (35), we
can recover the resource constraint of the economy (28).
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Rt  Rmt
Rt
=   (1  n1t)w1tHm=p (ct; bmt+1) = It: (34)
The production cost of money is paid by the government, so the governments budget con-
straint (GBC) is changed as
gt + r2tk2t + w2tn2t +Bt =
X
i=1;2

kitritkit + 
n
itwitnit

+
Bt+1
Rt
 Bt +
Mt+1  Mt
pt
: (35)
The optimal production for both the consumption good and real balances gives rise to the
marginal productivity conditions
rit = ik
i 1
it n
1 i
it ; wit = (1  i) k
i
it n
 i
it ; i = 1; 2: (36)
3.2 The Ramsey problem
The Ramsey problem is to choose fct; lt; kt+1; k2t;mt+1g
1
t=0 to maximize welfare, (1), subject to
the implementability condition (21) with
 
k0 ; r0; 

replaced by
 
k10; r10; 1

, and the resource
constraints13, for t  0,
ct+kt+1 (1  1) kt (1   2) k2t+gt = (kt   k2t)
1

1  lt  H (ct; bmt+1)  bm 11 2t+1 k  21 22t 1 2 :
(37)
An interior solution of the Ramsey problem requires the following optimality conditions,
ct : Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = t (1  1)kt   k2t
n1t
1
Hc (t) + 1

; t  1 (38)
lt : Ul (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = t (1  1)kt   k2t
n1t
1
; t  1 (39)
kt+1 : t = t+1
"
1

kt+1   k2t+1
n1t+1
1 1
+ 1  1
#
; t  0; (40)
k2t : 1

n1t
kt   k2t
1 1
=
(1  1)2
(1  2)

kt   k2t
n1t
1  bmt+1
k2t
 1
1 2
+ (1   2) ; t  0; (41)
bmt+1 :  (1  v)ul (ct; lt)Hbm (t) = t (1  1)kt   k2t
n1t
1 "
Hbm (t) +
1
1  2
 bmt+1
k2t
 2
1 2
#
; t  0;
(42)
where  and t; t  0, are the multipliers associated with the implementability condition, (21), and
the resource constraints, (37), respectively. Condition (41) is used to determine k2t. Condition
(42) di¤ers from condition (24), for the problem without costs of producing money, in the extra
term (bmt+1=k2t)2=(1 2) = (1  2).
13Notice that by substituting (27) and (26) into (28), we recover the resource constraint (37).
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3.3 Optimal policy and intuitions
Proposition 2 In a shopping-time monetary model with costly money, the optimal monetary
policy follows the rules:
It
>
=
<
(1  n2t) , if v
<
=
>
1: (43)
In the steady state, the optimal tax rate on physical capital employed in the consumption
sector is zero, i.e.,
k1 = 0;
and the optimal tax rule on physical capital employed in the money sector follows
k2
>
=
<
0, if (r2   2)
>
=
<
(r1   1) :
Proof The proof is put in Appendix B. 
Proposition 2 displays that if producing money uses resources of the market economy, then the
Friedman rule does not hold generally. That is, the nomianl interest rate is not zero in general,
which implies that the optimal ination rate is not zero. The optimal ination tax It (or the
net nominal interest rate it = It= (1  It)) hinges not only on the optimal tax rate on the labor
force employed in the money sector, n2t, but also on the degree of homogeneity of the transection
technology, v. If v < 1, then the optimal ination rate is larger thant the after-tax This case is
similar to and also a generalization of the Correia and Teles (1996) model with capital.
It is shown that the limiting tax rate on capital employed in the consumption sector is also
zero, i.e., k1 = 0, while the limiting tax on capital employed in the money sector depends. If
the net (of depreciation) return rate of capital in the money sector is larger than the one in the
concumption sector, then the government should tax the capital employed in the money sector
to remove arbitrage opportunities; if the net return rate of capital employed in the money sector
is less than the one in the consumption sector, then the government should subsidy the capital
employed in the money sector because the optimal capital tax rate in the consumption sector is
always zero. However, if the physical capital has the same net rate of return in both sectors, then
the limiting tax rate on the capital employed in the money sector is also zero.
4 Models with capital-in-utility (CIU) (Models 3 and 4)
In this section we introduce physical capital (kt) in the utility function of the household and inves-
tigate its model implications for optimal scal and monetary policy. Kurz (1968) pioneered this
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kind of capital-in-utility (CIU) model in the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopman (RCK) framework,
and examined its implications for growth performance. Later, a large literature on CIU explores
its theoretical and empirical implications for savings and growth (Kurz, 1968; Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite, 1992; Zou, 1994, 1995), for business cycle (Boileau and Rebecca, 2007; Karnizova,
2010; Michallat and Saez, 2015), for asset pricing (Bakshi and Chen, 1995; Smith, 2002; Boileau
and Rebecca, 2007), for wealth distribution (Luo and Young, 2009), for occupational choice in
labor markets (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008), and for rational bubbles (Zhou, 2016). In this section
we will examine how CIU a¤ects optimal scal and monetary policy in models with costless money
and costely money that we have have discussed in Sections 2 and 3.
Keeping all of the other elements of Models 1 and 2, we introduce physical capital kt in the
utility function of the household in both models respectively. Then the objective function of the
representative household is changed as follows:
1X
t=0
tu (ct; lt; kt) ; (44)
where kt  0 is the physical capital stock at time t, and the utility function satises uk > 0,
ukk < 0, uik  0, for i 2 fc; lg. The dependence of the utility function on physical capital stock
(or capital-in-utility) with uk > 0 and ukk < 0 captures Webers idea: capital accumulation in
a capitalist economy is motivated not only by the maximization of the long-run consumption,
but also by the enjoyment (utility) from enhancing wealth itself.14 Next we will examine the
capital-in-utility models with costless money and costly money.
4.1 Costless-money model with capital-in-utility (Model 3)
In this subsection we re-examine the costless-money model presented in Section 2 but with the
di¤erent objective function (44). The households problem is maximizing (44), subject to the
budget constraint (7), time allocation equation (2), and the shopping technology (3). The rst-
order necessary conditions with respect to ct; lt; bt+1 and mt+1 are the same as (8), (10), (11), and
(12), in which the arguments (ct; lt) of the utility function are replaced by (ct; lt; kt). However,
the rst-order necessary condition with respect to kt+1 is changed into
kt+1 : t = 
n
uk (ct+1; lt+1; kt+1) + t+1
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
io
; (45)
in which the positive term uk (ct+1; lt+1; kt+1) > 0 stands for a new channel to savings CIU.
15
Combining these rst-order conditions and compressing the arguments of (ct; lt; kt) and (ct; bmt+1)
14Zou (1994) calls this kind of capital-in-utility the "the spirit of capitalism" approach, motivating many discus-
sions in the literature. For more economic interpretations on the "spirit of capitalism" approach, please refer to
Zou (1994).
15This new savings motive can be seen more clearly from the steady state version of equation (47) without taxes,
Fk = 1=   1 +    uk= (uc   ulHc). The marginal product of capital Fk is lower than the one in the standard
model without capital-in-utility, due to the new positive term uk= (uc   ulHc) (> 0) here.
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as (t), we obtain
ul (t)
uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)
= (1  nt )wt; (46)
[uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)] = 
n
uk (t+ 1) + [uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)]
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
io
;
(47)
Rt =
 
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  h
1  uk(t+1)uc(t) ul(t)Hc(t)
i = [uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)]
 [uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)]
; (48)
Rt  Rmt
Rt
=   (1  nt )wtHm=p (ct; bmt+1) = It; (49)
Equation (46) tells the marginal rate of substitution between consumption (net of its utility
loss for the reduced leisure) and leisure equals their (after-tax) price ratios. In the consump-
tion Euler equation (47), capital-in-utility (uk > 0) generates a non-pecuniary return for physi-
cal capital uk (t+ 1) = [uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)], except for the pecuniary after-tax return 
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  

. The CIU brings about a positive savings e¤ect opposite to the dissav-
ings e¤ect of capital taxation, which makes the signs of the limiting capital taxes ambiguous. We
will examine this in the next subsection. The modied no-arbitrage condition for trades between
capital and bond (48) also has a new positive term uk (t+ 1) = [uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)]. Equation
(49) is exactly the one (17) in the costless-money model without CIU.
The governments budget constraint and the resource constraint are the same as the ones in
Section 2, (6) and (5), respectively. We derive the households present-value budget constraint
1X
t=0
24 q0t ct + it1+it bmt+1   (1  nt )wtnt
+q0t+1
uk(t+1)kt+1
uc(t+1) ul(t+1)Hc(t+1)
35 = h1  k0  r0 + 1  i k0 + b0 + m0p0 ; (50)
and the implementability condition
1X
t=0
t fuc (ct; lt; kt) ct   ul (ct; lt; kt) [1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1)] + uk (ct; lt; kt) ktg = A3; (51)
where
A3 = [uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]
h
1  k0

r0 + 1  
i
k0 + b0 +
m0
p0

+ uk (c0; l0; k0) k0:
The Ramsey problem is to maximize expression (44) subject to the implementability condi-
tion (51) and the feasibility constraint (5). Solving the Ramsey problem leads to the following
optimality conditions:
Ul (t)
Uc (t)
=
Fn (t)
Fn (t)Hc (t) + 1
; t  1 (52)
Uc (t)
[Fn (t)Hc (t) + 1]
= 

Uk (t+ 1) +
Uc (t+ 1)
[Fn (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1) + 1]
[Fk (t+ 1) + 1  ]

; t  1 (53)
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f(1 + )ul (t) +  [ucl (t) ct   ull (t)nt + ukl (t) kt]gHbm (t) = 0; t  0 (54)
Uc (0)  A3c = Uc (1)
[Fk (1) + 1  ]
[Fn (1)Hc (1) + 1]
; t = 0
Ul (0)  A3l = Uc (1) [Fk (1) + 1  ]
Fn (0)
Fn (1)
; t = 0:
Compared to (22)-(24) in Section 1, except for a new term Uk (t+ 1) in equality (53), the argu-
ments of the utility function are changed into (c; l; k). Then we have the following
Proposition 3 In a costless monetary model with capital-in-utility, the optimal ination tax is
always zero, i.e.,
It = 0;
which means that the (net) nominal interest rate is equal to zero, i.e., i = 0. Suppose the
economy converges to an interior steady state.16 The optimal capital income tax rate in the
steady state is
k =
1
Fk (uc   ulHc)
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1)
uc3   ul1
[uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc)] ; (55)
which shows that the optimal capital income tax is positive, zero, or negative, if and only
if [uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc)] is larger than, equal to, or less than zero. Namely,
k
>
=
<
0, [uk (1  Hc3)  2 (uc   ulHc)]
>
=
<
0:
Meanwhile, the formula for the optimal labor income tax rate in the steady state is
n =

1 + 
1
(uc   ulHc)Fn
[(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1] ; (56)
which shows that the optimal labor income tax is positive, zero, or negative, if and only if
[(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1] is larger than, equal to, or less than zero. Namely,
n
>
=
<
0, [(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1]
>
=
<
0:
16Di¤erent from the standard Ramsey model, we cannot prove the existence and uniqueness of the (non-
degenerate) steady state. In this model, the steady-state version of the consumption Euler equation is 1= =
uk= (uc   ulHc) +
 
1  k

Fk + 1  

. The new term uk= (uc   ulHc) prevents us from solving the steady state
easily and brings about the possibility of multiple equilibria, as Kurz (1968) had already talked about this. For this
reason, our paper assumes the existence of a steady state and focuses on the optimal taxation problem.
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Note that
1 = uccc  ulcn+ ul (1  v)Hc + ukck;
2 = uckc  ulkn+ ukkk;
3 = uclc  ulln+ uklk:
Proof The proof is placed in Appendix C. 
Proposition 3 tells that in the monetary growth model with capital in utility, the Friedman
rule is still optimal, while the Chamley-Judd zero capital taxation theorem does not hold. The
optimality of the Friedman rule in this case suggests that the optimal inationt tax hinges on the
production cost of real money balances, independent of capital accumulation and capital in utility.
Once the production cost of money approaches zero, the net norminal interest rate will be zero.
However, in this case, the limiting capital income tax is in general not zero, since the key term
uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc) in equation (55) is not equal to zero generally. Thus, if the repre-
sentative consumer cares about the utility from the physical capital stock, then the Chamley-Judd
zero capital income taxation theorem will be overturned. Furthermore, the sign of the optimal
capital tax rate relies only on the specication of the utility function and transaction technology
rather than the production technology, as is shown by the term uk (1   3Hc)   2 (uc   ulHc)
in equation (55). The sign of the limiting capital tax rate can be positive, negative or zero, which
displays that capital should be taxed, subsidized or left alone in the long run. Similarly, the sign
of the optimal labor income tax relies on the sign of the term [(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1].
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The ambiguous e¤ects on optimal taxation of capital-in-utility come from the non-pecuniary
return on capital driven by capital-in-utility, i.e., uk= (uc   ulHc), in the following asset-pricing
equation (i.e., rearranged consumption Euler equation (47)):
1 = 
uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)
uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)| {z }
SDF
8>>><>>>:
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)| {z }
non-pecuniary return
+
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
| {z }
pecuniary return
9>>>=>>>; :
(57)
Taxing capital discourages MPK-driven capital accumulation that - in the standard Ramsey
settings - leads to lower steady-state capital. However, lower steady-state capital increases the
numerator of the non-pecuniary comonent due to ukk < 0, and thereby encouraging the capital-
in-utility-driven capital accumulation. These two e¤ects are opposite in direction and hard to
determine which one dominates. Therefore, we cannot determine the sign of the limiting capital
income tax in general. Actually, if the implied change in steady-state is relatively small, the
17Li, Wang and Zou (2020) derived very similar results about the indeterminacy of the limiting factor income
taxation in a non-monetary model with capital-in-utility.
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whole non-pecuniary term can increase, thereby encouraging capitalin-utility-driven capital
accumulation. As a result, taxing capital might be relatively less or more distortionary in the
CIU specication than in the standard neoclassical model, capital tax has an ambiguous e¤ect
on steady-state capital accumulation in a model with capital-in-utility and hence the limiting
capital tax rate may have any sign. In particular, if capital is not in utility (i.e., uk = 0, which
implies that uk (1   3Hc)   2 (uc   ulHc) = 0), then the limiting capital income tax is zero
(i.e., k = 0). Meanwhile, the formula for the limiting labor income tax is degenerated to the one
in Model 1. The degenerate case without CIU is essentially Model 1 that examined in Section 2.
In the case without CIU, the asset-pricing equation is degenerated as the standard one:
1 = 
uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)
uc (t)  ul (t)Hc (t)| {z }
SDF
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
| {z }
pecuniary return
;
which shows that taxing capital leads to lower levels of physical capital and does harm to long
run economic growth. Hence, physical capital should be untaxed. These results correspond to
the Chamley-Judd zero capital income taxation theorem in a neoclassical growth model without
or with money.
Comparing our model to the one without capital-in-utility, we know that zero capital tax
results do not hold in any case. As is argued in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997), there is nothing
special for physical capital as a stock variable. Meanwhile, the limiting tax on labor income (as a
ow variable) is also ambiguous and its sign depends on specications on both the utility function
and the production technology.
To develop more intuitions for optimal capital taxation, we assume that there is no money in
the economy (i.e., st = H (ct; bmt+1) = 0) the instantaneous utility function of the representative
consumer is additively separable with respect to its three arguments, namely,
u (c; l; k) = cu (c) + lv (l) + kw (k) ; i > 0; i 2 fc; l; kg : (58)
Hence we know that u0 > 0, u00 < 0, v0 > 0, v00 < 0, w0 > 0, and w00 < 0, due to the assumed
properties of u (c; l; k). Then we have the following
Corollary 1 Assume that there is no money and the utility function takes the form in (58). The
limiting capital income tax is positive, zero, or negative, if and only if the capital elasticity
of marginal utility of capital is less than, equal to, or larger than the consumption elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption. That is,
k
>
=
<
0()
w00 (k) k
w0 (k)
<
=
>
u00 (c) c
u0 (c)
:
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Meanwhile, the optimal labor income tax is nonnegative, namely,
n =
1
ucFn

1 + 
( ulln  ucccFn)  0:
Furthermore, if the utility function is constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA), i.e., u (c; l; k) =
c
 
c1 1=c   1

= (1  1=c)+l
 
l1 1=l   1

= (1  1=l)+k
 
k1 1=k   1

= (1  1=k), where
i; i 2 fc; l; kg are the constant elasticities of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for three types
of utility goods, then we know that
k
>
=
<
0() k
<
=
>
c:
Proof We easily prove Corollary 1 by substitution. 
Corollary 1 explores a special case with additively separable utility functions by assuming
away money and shopping technologies. It is shown that optimal capital taxes depend on the
relative values of the marginal utility elasticities for di¤erent utility goods (consumption goods and
capital goods). If the marginal utility of capital responses more sensitively to one percent change
of capital stock, compared to the response of the marginal utility of consumption to one percent
change of consumption, then the optimal capital tax will be positive; if not, the optimal capital
tax will be negative. If they (consumption and capital goods) have the same sensitivity, then
the optimal capital tax will be zero. Simple calculations gives rise to c =  u
0 (c) =u00 (c) c, n =
 v0 (1  n) =v00 (1  n)n, and k =  w
0 (k) =w00 (k) k. In particular, if the additively separable
utility functions are constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA), namely,
u (c; l; k) = c
 
c1 1=c   1

(1  1=c)
+ l
 
l1 1=l   1

(1  1=l)
+ k
 
k1 1=k   1

(1  1=k)
;
where i; i 2 fc; l; kg are the constant elasticities of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for three
types of utility goods, then we have that
k
>
=
<
0() k
<
=
>
c:
That is, if the EIS of the consumption goods, c, is larger than (equal to, or less than) that of the
capital goods, k, then the limiting capital income tax is positive (zero, or negative).
4.2 The costly-money model with capital-in-utility (Model 4)
In this section we examine a costly-money model with capital-in-utility. We formulate this case
by either introducing physical capital in the utility function in Model 2 or incorporating the
production technology of real money balances in Model 3.
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The households optimization problem is to maximize the objective function, (44), subject to
the budget constraint, (30), the time allocation equation, (27), and the shopping technology, (3).
The rst-order necessary conditions are
ul (ct; lt; kt)
uc (ct; lt; kt)  ul (ct; lt; kt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) = (1  n1t)w1t; (59)
uc (t) ul (t)Hc (t) = 
n
uk (t+ 1) +
h
1  k1t+1

r1t+1 + 1  1
i
[uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)]
o
;
(60)
Rt =
 
1  k1t+1

r1t+1 + 1  h
1  uk(t+1)uc(t) ul(tt)Hc(ct;bmt+1)
i = uc (ct; lt; kt)  ul (ct; lt; kt)Hc (ct; bmt+1)
 [uc (ct+1; lt+1; kt+1)  ul (ct+1; lt+1; kt+1)Hc (ct+1; bmt+2)] ;
(61)
Rt  Rmt
Rt
=   (1  n1t)w1tHm=p (ct; bmt+1) = It: (62)
Compared to the rst-order conditions (31)-(34) in Model 2, here there is a new term about uk
in equalities (60) and (61), and the arguments in the utility function are (c; l; k).
The households present-value budget constraint and the implementability condition are (50)
and (51), respectively, with
 
k0 ; r0; ; k0

replaced by
 
k10; r10; 1; k10

. The resource constraint is
the same as the one in Model 2, (37).
The Ramsey problem is to maximize the objective function, (44), subject to the implementabil-
ity condition, (51), and the resource constraint, (37). The associated optimality conditions are
ct : Uc (t) = t

(kt   k2t)
1 (1  1)n
 1
1t Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1 ; t  1
lt : Ul (t) = t (kt   k2t)
1 (1  1)n
 1
1t ; t  1
kt+1 : t = 
n
Uk (t+ 1) + t+1
h
1 (kt+1   k2t+1)
1 1 n1 11t+1 + 1  1
io
; t  0
k2t : 1

kt   k2t
n1t
1 1
=
(1  1)2
(1  2)

kt   k2t
n1t
1  bmt+1
k2t
 1
1 2
+ (1   2)
bmt+1 :  (1  v)ul (ct; lt; kt)Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = t (1  1)kt   k2t
n1t
1 "
Hbm (ct; bmt+1) + 1
1  2
 bmt+1
k2t
 2
1 2
#
; t 
where
U (t) = u (ct; lt; kt)+ [uc (ct; lt; kt) ct   ul (ct; lt; kt) [1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1)] + uk (ct; lt; kt) kt] ;
Uc (t) = uc (t) +  [ucc (t) ct + uc (t)  ulc (t)nt + ul (t) (1  v)Hc (t) + ukc (t) kt] ;
Ul (t) = ul (t) +  [ucl (t) ct   ull (t)nt + ul (t) + ukl (t) kt] ;
Uk (t+ 1) = uk (t+ 1) +  [uck (t+ 1) ct+1   ulk (t+ 1)nt+1 + ukk (t+ 1) kt+1 + uk (t+ 1)] :
Then we have the following
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Proposition 4 In a costly-money model with capital-in-utility, the optimal monetary policy fol-
lows the following rules:
It
>
=
<
(1  n2t) , if v
<
=
>
1: (63)
Suppose the economy converges to an interior steady state. In the steady state, the formula
of the limiting tax on capital employed in the consumption sector is
k1 =
1
Fk1 (uc   ulHc)
ucFn1   ul (Fn1Hc + 1)
uc3   ul1
[uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc)] :
It is positive, zero, or negative, if and only if [uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc)] is larger
than, equal to, or less than zero, i.e.,
k1
>
=
<
0, [uk (1  Hc3)  2 (uc   ulHc)]
>
=
<
0:
The formula of the limiting tax on capital employed in the money sector is
k2 =
(r2   2)  (r1   1)
r2
+
r1
r2
k1 : (64)
Then we know that
k2
>
=
<
(r2   2)  (r1   1)
r2
, if k1
>
=
<
0:
Proof The proof of the optimal monetary policy rules here is very similar to the case with costly
money in Model 2, and the derivations of k1 and 
n are very similar to the case with costless
money in Model 3. Hence we omit them here. The results on k2 are due to the no-arbitrage
condition of factor mobility, i.e. (29). 
Proposition 4 displays that in the model with costly money and CIU, the Friedman rule is
not optimal in genenal and the optimal ination tax depends on the optimal tax on the labor
employed in the money sector, n2t, and the degree of homogeneity of the transaction function, v.
Note that the optimal tax rates n2t in the expressions of (43) and (63) are di¤erent, since they
are endogenously determined in the analytical framework of Ramsey taxation.
In this case, the limiting taxes on the capital income are more complicated. The sign of
the limiting tax on capital employed in the consumption good is determined by the sign of the
expression, [uk (1  Hc3)  2 (uc   ulHc)], which is indeterminate. The reason for this deter-
minacy is very similar to Model 3, which is omitted here. The limiting tax rate on the capital
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employed in the money sector relies on two factors: the relative values of net real returns of
capital employed in the two sectors, [(r2   2)  (r1   1)] =r2 and r1=r2, and the limiting tax
rate on the capital employed in the consumption sector, k1 . If the limiting tax 
k
1 is zero (i.e.,
k1 = 0), then the limiting tax is equal to the di¤erence between net real returns of capital in both
sectors (i.e., k2 = [(r2   2)  (r1   1)] =r2). If the limiting tax 
k
1 is positive (i.e., 
k
1 > 0), then
the limiting tax is larger than the di¤erence of net real returns of capital in both sectors (i.e.,
k2 > [(r2   2)  (r1   1)] =r2); and vice versa.
5 Conclusion
In the paper we reexamine the optimal scal and monetary policy in a combined shopping-
time monetary model with capital accumulation. With di¤erent combinations of two important
channels (i.e., the production cost of money and capital in utility), we examine four models in
which we derive many interesting results. In the costless-money model without CIU, we recover
the classical results in dynamic taxation theory and optimal monetary theory: both the Friedman
rule and the Chamley-Judd zero capital income taxation theorem hold. When producing money
is costly, the Friedman rule is not optimal and the optimal ination rate relies on the optimal
tax rate on the labor force employed in the money sector and the homogeneity of the transaction
technology. Meanwhile, the tax structure for capital income is changed accordingly. When the
consumer cares about the utility from the physical capital stock, the Chamley-Judd theorem will
not hold and the limiting taxes on the physical capital deviate from zero due to the tradeo¤s
between the non-pecuniary return and pecuniary return of capital accumulation. In the more
complicated Model 4, neither the Friedman rule nor the Chamley-Judd theorem holds. The
production cost of money and CIU interact in determining the optimal scal and monetary policy.
6 Mathematical appendix
6.1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Firstly, we derive the implementability condition. Iterating the households
ow budget constraint from period zero, we have
b0 = q
0
T
bT+1
RT
+ q0T
mT+1
pT
+
TX
t=0
q0t ct +
T 1X
t=0
q0t
it
1 + it
bmt+1   TX
t=0
q0t (1  
n
t )wtnt+
TX
t=0
q0t kt+1  
T 1X
t=0
q0t+1
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
kt+1  
h
1  k0

r0 + 1  
i
k0  
m0
p0
:
Using the no-arbitrage condition (15), taking the limits on the both sides with T ! +1, and
imposing the transversality conditions limT!+1 q
0
T
bT+1
RT
= 0 and limT!+1 q
0
T
mT+1
pT
= 0, we obtain
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the present-value budget constraint:
+1X
t=0
q0t

ct   (1  
n
t )wtnt +
it
1 + it
bmt+1 = h1  k0  r0 + 1  i k0 + b0 + m0p0 :
Substituting (13), (17), (20) and (4) into the present-value budget constraint and rearranging
it, we obtain the implementability condition, (21):
1X
t=0
t [uc (ct; lt) ct   ul (ct; lt) (1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1))] = A;
where A is given by
A = A

c0; l0; k0; b0;m0; 
k
0

= [uc (c0; l0)  ul (c0; l0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

r0 + 1  

k0 + b0 +
m0
p0

:
Secondly, we solve the Ramsey problem using the Primal approach. The Ramsey problem
is to maximize expression (1) subject to the implementability condition (21) and the feasibility
constraint (5). Let  be a Lagrange multiplier on equation (21) and dene
U (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = u (ct; lt) +  [uc (ct; lt) ct   ul (ct; lt) (1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1))] :
Then we construct the Lagrangian
L=
1X
t=0
t fU (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) + t [F (kt; 1  lt  H (ct; bmt+1)) + (1  ) kt   ct   gt   kt+1]g  A;
where ftg
1
t=0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers. First-order conditions for this problem are
ct : Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = t [Fn (kt; nt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1] ; t  1
lt : Ul (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = tFn (kt; nt) ; t  1
kt+1 : t = t+1 [Fk (kt+1; nt+1) + 1  ] ; t  0
bmt+1 : [ (1  v)ul (ct; lt)  tFn (kt; nt)]Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = 0; t  0
c0 : Uc (0) = 0 [Fn (k0; n0)Hc (c0; bm1) + 1] + Ac; t = 0
l0 : Ul (0) = 0Fn (0) + Al; t = 0
where
Uc (0) = uc (0) + 
"
ucc (0) c0 + uc (0) + ul (0) (1  v)Hc (0)
 ulc (0) (1  l0   (1  v)H (0))
#
;
Ul (c0; l0) = ul (0) +  [ucl (0) c0   ull (0) (1  l0   (1  v)H (0)) + ul (0)] ;
Ac =
[ucc (0)  ulc (0)Hc (0)  ul (0)Hcc (0)]
[uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]
A  [uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

Fkn (0)Hc (0) k0;
22
Al =
[ucl (0)  ull (0)Hc (0)]
[uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]
A  [uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

Fkn (0) k0:
Combining the above rst-order conditions, we have the following optimality conditions:
Ul (ct; lt; bmt+1; )
Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; ) = Fn (kt; nt)Fn (kt; nt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1 ; t  1;
Uc (ct; lt; bmt+1; )
[Fn (kt; nt)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1] = Uc (ct+1; lt+1; bmt+2; )[Fn (kt+1; nt+1)Hc (ct+1; bmt+2) + 1] [Fk (kt+1; nt+1) + 1  ] ; t  1;
[(+ 1)ul (ct; lt) +  (ucl (ct; lt) ct   ull (ct; lt)nt)]Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = 0; t  0;
Uc (0)  A1c = Uc (1)
[Fk (1) + 1  ]
[Fn (1)Hc (1) + 1]
; t = 0;
Ul (0)  A1l = Uc (1) [Fk (1) + 1  ]
Fn (0)
Fn (1)
; t = 0:
Thirdly, the optimality of the Friedman rule and zero capital income taxation is veried in the
main tex in Section 2.1. Finally, from the rst order conditions with respect to ct and lt, in the
steady state, we have
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1) =

1 + 
[(FnHc + 1) (uclc  ulln)  Fn (uccc  ulcn+ ul (1  v)Hc)] :
Solving from (13) and (18) gives rise to
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1) = (uc   ulHc)Fn
n:
Combining the above equalities leads to the formula for the limiting labor income tax:
n =

1 + 
(FnHc + 1) (uclc  ulln)  Fn [uccc  ulcn+ ul (1  v)Hc]
(uc   ulHc)Fn
;
which may be positive, negative or zero. 
6.2 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. From (42), the solution is
Hbm (t) =
tw1t
1 2

bmt+1
kt k1t
 2
1 2
 (1  v)ul (ct; lt)  tw1t
:
Notice that, as we saw in Section 2.1,  (1  v)ul (ct; lt)   tw1t 6= 0. Combining the above
equation with the necessary condition (34) of the private problem gives us the equality
tw1t
1 2

bmt+1
kt k1t
 2
1 2
tw1t    (1  v)ul (ct; lt)
=
It
(1  n1t)w1t
:
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If v = 1, then we have It
(1 n1t)w1t
= 11 2

bmt+1
kt k1t
 2
1 2 . Using the no-arbitrage condition for labor
mobility and the production function of money (26), we have that 1   n2t = It. If v > 1, then
It
(1 n1t)w1t
< 11 2

bmt+1
kt k1t
 2
1 2 . By the similar procedure, we obtain 1   n2t > It. Conversely, if
v > 1, then the similar argument gives us 1  n2t < It.
Substituting (38) into (40), we have
Uc (t)
1 + Fn1 (t)Hc (t)
= 
Uc (t+ 1)
1 + Fn1 (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)
[Fk1 (t+ 1) + 1  1] :
In the steady state, it turns out to
1 =  (r1 + 1  1) :
Meanwhile, equality (32) turns out to
1 = 
h
1  k1

r1 + 1  1
i
:
Combining them gives rise to k1 = 0. In the steady state, plugging 
k
1 = 0 into (29) leads to
k2 =
(r2   2)  (r1   1)
r2
;
which establishes the results presented in Proposition 3.1. 
6.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3. The present-value budget constraint is derived as0@ P+1t=0 q0t hct   (1  nt )wtnt + it1+it bmt+1i
+
P+1
t=0

q0t   q
0
t+1
 
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
	
kt+1
1A = h1  k0  r0 + 1  i k0 + b0 + m0p0 :
(65)
Combining the no-arbitrage condition (15) and the rst-order condition w.r.t c, l and b, we obtain
Rt  
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
=
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)
:
Multiplying the both sides of the above equation with q0t+1 gives rise to
q0t   q
0
t+1
h
1  kt+1

rt+1 + 1  
i
= q0t+1
uk (t+ 1)
uc (t+ 1)  ul (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1)
: (66)
Substituting (66) into (65) leads to the present-value budget constraint, (50). Putting (20) with
the arguments (c; l; k) in the utility function, (46) and (49) into (50) leads to the implementability
condition, (51).
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The Ramsey problem is to maximize expression (44) subject to the implementability condition
(51) and the feasibility constraint (5). The rst-order conditions for this problem are
ct : Uc (t) = t [Fn (t)Hc (ct; bmt+1) + 1] ; t  1 (67)
lt : Ul (t) = tFn (t) ; t  1 (68)
kt+1 : t =  fUk (t+ 1) + t+1 [Fk (t+ 1) + 1  ]g ; t  0 (69)
bmt+1 : [ (1  v)ul (ct; lt; kt)  tFn (t)]Hbm (ct; bmt+1) = 0; t  0 (70)
c0 : Uc (0) = 0 [Fn (0)Hc (0) + 1] + Ac;
l0 : Ul (0) = 0Fn (0) + Al;
k0 : Uk (0) = Ak   0 [F (0) + (1  )] ;
where
U (t) = u (ct; lt; kt)+ [uc (ct; lt; kt) ct   ul (ct; lt; kt) [1  lt   (1  v)H (ct; bmt+1)] + uk (ct; lt; kt) kt] ;
Uc (t) = uc (t) +  [ucc (t) ct + uc (t)  ulc (t)nt + ul (t) (1  v)Hc (t) + ukc (t) kt] ;
Ul (t) = ul (t) +  [ucl (t) ct   ull (t)nt + ul (t) + ukl (t) kt] ;
Uk (t+ 1) = uk (t+ 1) +  [uck (t+ 1) ct+1   ulk (t+ 1)nt+1 + ukk (t+ 1) kt+1 + uk (t+ 1)] ;
Uc (0) = uc (0) + 
"
ucc (0) c0 + uc (0) + ul (0) (1  v)Hc (0)
 ulc (0) (1  l0   (1  v)H (0))
#
;
Ul (0) = ul (0) +  [ucl (0) c0   ull (0) (1  l0   (1  v)H (0)) + ul (0)] ;
A3c =
[ucc (0)  ulc (0)Hc (0)  ul (0)Hcc (0)]
[uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]
A3 [uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

Fkn (0)Hc (0) k0;
A3l =
[ucl (0)  ull (0)Hc (0)]
[uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]
A3   [uc (0)  ul (0)Hc (0)]

1  k0

Fkn (0) k0:
Combining these conditions, we have
Ul (t)
Uc (t)
=
Fn (t)
Fn (t)Hc (t) + 1
; t  1
Uc (t)
[Fn (t)Hc (t) + 1]
= 
Uc (t+ 1)
[Fn (t+ 1)Hc (t+ 1) + 1]
[Fk (t+ 1) + 1  ] ; t  1
f(1 + )ul (t) +  [ucl (t) ct   ull (t)nt + ukl (t) kt]gHbm (t) = 0; t  0 (71)
Uc (0)  A3c = Uc (1)
[Fk (1) + 1  ]
[Fn (1)Hc (1) + 1]
; t = 0
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Ul (0)  A3l = Uc (1) [Fk (1) + 1  ]
Fn (0)
Fn (1)
; t = 0:
From equalities (70) and (71), by the similar procedure to that in the proof of Proposition 1,
we conclude that the Friedman rule is optimal, namely, It = it = 0.
To examine the optimal tax rates, we consider the special case in which there is a T  0
for which gt = g for all t  T . Assume that there exists a stationary solution to the Ramsey
problem and that it converges to a time-invariant allocation, so that c, l, bm and k are constant
after some time. The steady state of the economy can be found by solving the steady state version
of equations (67)-(69):
uc +  [uccc+ uc   ulcn+ ul (1  v)Hc + ukck] =  (FnHc + 1) ; (72)
 =  [uk +  (uckc  ulkn+ ukkk + uk) +  (Fk + 1  )] ; (73)
ul +  (uclc  ulln+ ul + uklk) = Fn; (74)
Equations (72)-(74) are rewritten as
FnHc + 1 =
1 + 

uc +


264uccc  ulcn+ ul (1  v)Hc + ukck| {z }
1
375 ; (75)
1   (Fk + 1  ) = uk
1 + 

+ 


0@uckc  ulkn+ ukkk| {z }
2
1A ; (76)
Fn =
1 + 

ul +


0@uclc  ulln+ uklk| {z }
3
1A : (77)
We solve equations (75) and (77) for (1 + ) = and = as follows:
1 + 

=
(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1
uc3   ul1
; (78)


=
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1)
uc3   ul1
: (79)
The steady-state version of consumption Euler equation (47) is changed as
[1   (Fk + 1  )] (uc   ulHc) = uk    (uc   ulHc) 
kFk: (80)
Substituting (78)-(80) into (76) yields us the formula for the capital income tax rate (55), namely,
k =
1
Fk (uc   ulHc)
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1)
uc3   ul1
[uk (1   3Hc)  2 (uc   ulHc)] :
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From equation (79), the term ucFn ul(FnHc+1)uc3 ul1 =

 is nonnegative, because the Lagrange
multiplier  is nonnegative, while the insatiable utility function implies that  is strictly positive.
Note that Fk and (uc   ulHc) are both nonnegative. Hence the sign of the limiting capital income
tax is determined completely by the sign of the term [uk (1  Hc3)  2 (uc   ulHc)].
From equalities (75) and (77), we have
ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1) =

1 + 
[(FnHc + 1) 3   Fn1] : (81)
Equation (46) yields us
Fn (uc   ulHc) 
n = ucFn   ul (FnHc + 1) : (82)
Combining equations (81) and (82), we derive the formula for the optimal labor income tax, i.e.,
(56), whose sign is also indeterminate. 
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